lead not only in the study of the impact of legal and institutional factors on economic outcomes but also in the study of the development of legal institutions. Is this another manifestation of the imperialistic tendencies of economics to study and explain disciplines? Is this another example of the pragmatism and openness of the discipline of economics, of its willingness to study and borrow from other disciplines? What can we learn from this experience about the future prospects of legal scholarship?
In this Essay, I will discuss three debates that have much in common yet contain sufficiently different characteristics to highlight different types of interplay. All of the debates began with a contribution by leading economists. They all touched on law and on problems that interested legal scholars. They all arose more than a decade ago. 2 In fact, all of the original contributions were published between 1989 and 1998. This provided legal scholars with sufficient time to comprehend the debates and to respond to them as they found them relevant. The articles that sparked these debates were all frequently cited and highly influential. They became canonical works in the field of economics and had a significant impact on other social science disciplines.
The first debate focuses on an article by Avner Greif that deals with the apparent irrelevance of the law in situations in which lawyers would consider the law determinative. The second debate focuses on an article by Douglass North and Barry Weingast that claims that law is important but shows that it can only function together with other institutional factors. The third debate focuses on an article by Andrei Shleifer and his coauthors (collectively known as LLSV) that demonstrates that the law determines economic outcomes. To be clear, institutional economics in general, these three examples, and my claim in this Essay are all confined to positive scholarship.
My own inclination toward historical studies affected the selection of the examples and narrowed the implications inferable from them. I leave to other authors the task of discussing the interplay between the legal discipline and other disciplines with respect to con- temporary issues, normative and prescriptive topics, and the research and debates about these issues and topics. This Essay will first present each of the three debates in terms of their content and impact. It will then analyze the legal responses to the debates in the same order. Finally, it will offer some observations about the state of legal scholarship and legal theory as reflected in these debates.
I REPUTATION AND COALITIONS
The first example I consider is Avner Greif's contribution to the study of agency relationship. Greif's first contribution to this field was Reputation and Coalitions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders, published in 1989.3 In the five years that followed, he published a series of related articles in leading economics journals. 4 In 2006, he integrated his project into a book. 5 He received a MacArthur Foundation Fellowship (Genius Grant) in 1998 and is currently a professor of economics and the Bowman Family Endowed Professor in Humanities and Sciences at Stanford University.
His contribution in Reputation and Coalitions was to show how appropriate informal institutions can solve agency problems between merchants and their overseas agents. 6 This solution worked well despite difficult cultural, geographic, and legal background conditions. 7 Greif specifically noted that the legal system failed to provide a framework to organize and enforce agency relationships and contracts. 8 Initially, there was a significant information asymmetry between the agent who traveled abroad and the principal that remained at home. 9 The functioning of the informal institution was not explained by altruism associated with family, ethnic, or religious affinity. 1 0 It was also not explained by the repeated dealings between principal and agent that typically give rise to reputation-based enforcement."
The solution was the coalition, a self-enforcing institution that aligned the interests of agents and principals.1 2 Membership in the coalition required each member to provide, for the benefit of all members, information on market conditions and on all agents and transactions (even transactions conducted by other merchants and their agents). 13 Membership also required inflicting multilateral punishment on agents that cheated other members in the coalition.14 Though the common social background of members in the coalition facilitated the flow of information, it was not in itself the source of obedience by agents.' 5 Greif's contribution could be relevant to lawyers because it shows the conditions under which the law is irrelevant or redundant. Specifically, without institutions that facilitate an expected flow of information, the law cannot enforce agency contracts because legal institutions alone cannot guarantee an appropriate flow of information. Greifs coalition, however, could impose sufficient sanctions without resorting to the legal system or to the state. Moreover, ostracism from a close-knit society or expulsion from an essential and exclusive marketplace, such as a fair or a port, was not the only available sanction. Crucially, the system did not rely on a third-party verifier or enforcer. It was the first-best solution, not a solution of last resort that replaced a malfunctioning legal system. Douglass North and Barry Weingast's seminal article on "credible commitment" has proven the most influential explanation of the economic and financial significance of the Glorious Revolution of 1688/89. They argued that the establishment of parliamentary supremacy over public finance created an environment in which investors could rely upon the state to meet its financial promises. The Financial Revolution, upon which Britain's rise to great power status was founded, followed from this development.
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This statement demonstrates North and Weingast's contribution that the British solved the credible commitments problem through the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the measures that followed it. The solution allowed measurable and dramatic changes on several connected levels that included an increase in government borrowing, 1 9 lowering of interest paid by the government on its debt, 2 0 an expansion of the government bond market and private capital markets, 2 ' Britain's ability to wage prolonged and successful wars, 22 The implications of the credible commitments framework go beyond the Glorious Revolution and the market for state bonds, which, for North and Weingast, serve only as an important case study. A strong and unconstrained state cannot credibly commit to refrain from expropriating from its creditors. The ability to expropriate is a curse, not a blessing, to a despotic state: it cannot borrow. On a more general level, a predatory state cannot commit to refrain from expropriating property of any sort. The more likely a sovereign is to expropriate, the lower the expected return on its investment and the lower its incentive to invest. The impact of the credible commitments framework beyond the history of the Glorious Revolution is evident in the pattern of its citations as reflected in SSCI.26 Table 2 shows that, although North and Weingast's article was cited 54 times in history journals, it was also cited 214 times in economics journals, 121 times in political science journals, 21 times in sociology journals, and 49 times in law journals.
Though North and Weingast portray their project as dealing with the political factors underpinning economic growth, they, in fact, place law in the center. The factors are the rules governing economic change, the institutions that enforce the rules, and the institutions that govern the way these rules may be changed. These rules and institutions are legal and constitutional.
The British solved the problem of credible commitments partly by redesigning their constitution to limit the power of the state. 2 7 Specifically, they weakened the Crown by shifting power to Parliament through the Bill of Rights and by establishing a constitutional monarchy. Additionally, they required parliamentary assent to taxes and loans. 28 Through Acts of Parliament, they ensured loan repayment by earmarking taxes to be used for repayment of specific loans. 2 9 However, the British constitution was not paramount or entrenched, and the empowered Parliament could still expropriate by way of legislation. The British needed additional shackles, so they formed institutions that would counterbalance Parliament-most notably, the Bank of England. The Bank administered the national debt of Britain, en- LLSV developed a system for coding and measuring the legal rules that govern the protection of outside investors in corporations. They then showed that the legal rules that protect investors vary systematically among legal traditions, or legal origins. LLSV found that common law countries provide the most protection, German-based and Scandinavian civil law countries provide a medium level of protection, and French civil law countries provide the least protection." 9 They then correlated these levels of protection with economic outcomes and found that legal origins explained the ownership structure of corporations, firm valuation, extent and liquidity of the stock market, and eventually, economic development. 4 0 They argued that because the law in most countries was transplanted by colonial powers, its causal direction is not in doubt. 4 ' Specifically, developed economies did not adopt common law systems; common law countries, on the other hand, developed sophisticated economies due to their legal origins.
4 2 Through their influential series of articles, LLSV convinced nonlegal scholars that law matters. In fact, the first to pick up this message, as reflected in Table 3 below, were finance scholars, economists, business and management professors, and only more slowly and to a more limited extent, legal scholars.
IV LEGAL SCHOLARS AND REPUTATION AND COALITIONS
Most of the references to Greif in the legal literature are in law and economics journals and law and society journals. Economists and sociologists make some of these references, mostly by way of application of Greif's models to nonlegal contexts. This application is to agency relationships and other contracts that operate subject to information asymmetries and show that reputation mechanisms, private or- A notable exception to this trend is Barak Richman. 4 4 His work on the intersections of legal, institutional, and market enforcement relies on Greif's model and extends it by formulating a positive model that predicts when commercial parties will employ private ordering to enforce their agreements.
4 5 He identifies factors that determine the use of firms, courts, and reputation-based private ordering to control agency relationships. 46 Richman demonstrates that legal scholars did not utilize Greifs contributions in a sophisticated way in their own disciplinary concern.
In March 2008, Jeremy Edwards and Sheilagh Ogilvie, two Cambridge economists, posted their working paper Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders Reappraised online. 47 The paper created heated controversy in the economic and legal blogosphere. It argued that the case of the Maghribi traders did not fit Greifs interpretation 48 and that the Maghribis instead used formal legal mechanisms.
49 Edwards and Ogilvie argued that the Geniza documents, the basic primary source Greif used to support his argument, actually reveal that these traders made widespread and voluntary use of the formal legal system by resorting to the Jewish law system and occasionally to the Muslim legal framework. 5 0 They further argued that there is no evidence for the existence of traders' coalitions.5 1 Ultimately, they contended that Greif had not identified a case of informal reputation-and coalition-based enforcement but rather a familiar case of legal enforcement. 2421, 2426-27, 2433-34, 2456-57 (2000) .
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Lisa Bernstein is another example. She studied privately drafted commercial codes and arbitration tribunals in the diamond and cotton industries, yet her contributions were initially independent of Greif's. 52 He examined Edwards and Ogilvie's evidence that the Maghribis resorted to the legal system and argued that they had misread the Geniza records. 5 3 They presented nonagency-related matters, nontrade-related matters, and even matters that could only be performed through court orders, such as inheritance and family court orders, as evidence for the resort of agents to the legal system. Greif carefully reexamined all 745 merchant letters in the relevant corpus of the Geniza and found only three documents reflecting disputes involving agency relations and only one that did not involve a nonMaghribi. 5 4 Several bloggers found Greif's response persuasive and agreed that he had proved that his critics had misinterpreted the evidence.66
The main conclusion that I draw from this exchange is that lawyers were clearly absent. Two economists argued that the law mattered-and that was only two decades after Greif's initial contribution. Similarly, doctoral students connected to the Geniza Project at Princeton University have conducted constructive and interesting studies of the interplay between the legal system and informal systems in the era of the Geniza in recent years. 5 6 Legal historians and legal scholars of private ordering were strikingly absent. They were not involved in the historical line of research and did not take part in the controversy. With the exception of Richman, mentioned above, and possibly a couple of other legal scholars that my survey may have missed, legal scholars did not contribute to the theory, the modeling, or the examination of these case studies. Now, after the outbreak of the controversy and following the recent research by historians, it cannot be argued that this lack of interest resulted from the irrelevancy of the topic to lawyers due to the absence of formal law. 
V LEGAL SCHOLARS AND CONSTITUTIONS AND COMMITMENT
Turning to North and Weingast's scholarship on credible commitments, lawyers should be interested in this work because it provides a new understanding of a significant event in Anglo-American constitutional history: the Glorious Revolution. Lawyers should be interested in it because it offers a new framework for understanding the role of constitutions as credible commitment devices and their effect on markets, interest rates, and eventually economic development. Moreover, they should be interested in it because it demonstrates how legal and constitutional factors combine with institutional and political factors with meanings that cannot be understood when divorced from these factors.
Legal scholars, however, do not exhibit this interest. Legal scholarship frequently mentions the phrase "credible commitments" without explicit reference to North and Weingast's articles and without awareness of the specifics of their analytical framework or case study. 5 7 Legal scholars often only take the general notion that sovereigns encounter a credible commitments problem. They do not examine whether sovereigns apply the full set of tools identified by North and Weingast, a combination of constitutional, institutional, and political tools.
5 8 It is no coincidence that only one lawyer (myself) presented at the recent four-day conference that revisited the credible commitments thesis. A recent review of this book, coauthored by a law professor and a business school professor, and published in a leading economics journal, epitomizes the growing interdisciplinary discourse. 64
VI LEGAL SCHOLARS AND LAW AND FINANCE
In The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, published in 2008 in the Journal of Economic Literature, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (without Vishny) consolidated their main findings, offered an overall interpretation of these findings, and addressed the objections raised over the previous decade to their legal origins thesis. 65 As this Essay does not aim to evaluate the validity of their thesis, I will not examine the substance of their response. Instead, I will use it to uncover which of the objections came from legal scholars and whether these scholars used a theory or a perspective that is peculiarly legal. LLS's references include quite a few legal scholars. 66 These are divisible into two groups. The first group of references is to the literature that predated their project. It includes exclusively comparative law scholars. This observation suggests that comparative law scholars did not respond to LLSV or at least did not respond in a manner that LLSV found relevant. I will get to them below. The second group includes scholars that responded to the LLSV project. It primarily includes corporate law scholars from the law and economics branch. Legal scholars can be found throughout the survey and are mixed with economists and finance scholars. This suggests that legal scholars launched criticisms of various types, indistinguishable from criticism coming from other disciplines.
Some argued that external nonlegal underlying factors, rather than legal origins, might explain LLSV's modern legal outcome. For example, Mark Roe claims that the destruction inflicted by World War II can explain continental political radicalization that in turn led to hostility to financial markets and weak legal protection for investors. comes can be explained by colonial origins at least as well as by legal origins. They assert that the apparent common law advantage LLSV uncovered may result either from the full colonial package implemented by British rulers in their colonies, including governance, infrastructure, and education, or from the fact that the British, as the most powerful colonial power, picked up territories that, due to their natural endowments, size, or position, ended up performing better economically. 68 Amir Licht and his collaborators conclude that differences in culture better explain the differences in law than legal origins. 69 In fact, all of these legal scholars say that the law does not matter at all.
Other legal scholars have argued that strong investor protection in common law countries is a recent phenomenon. For example, Brian Cheffins argues that Britain still had weak protection for investors in the early twentieth century after it experienced its prolonged and unprecedented economic growth. 7 0 Additionally, Daniel Klerman and Paul Mahoney examined the historical evidence and claim that common law courts were just as centralized as the French courts and that common law judges were not more independent until the eighteenth century. 7 ' Thus, the differences in the legal system that LLSV view as explaining the divergent economic outcomes were not present at the origins. This type of criticism is in fact more historical than legal. It challenges LLSV's argument by pointing to its static and ahistorical approach.
Several legal scholars offered criticism from a more legal perspective. Several legal scholars have argued that by their methodological need to code and quantify legal rules for comparative purposes, LLSV ended up focusing on the clear rules found in statutes and neglected or mistreated the complications, nuances, and contradictions of judge-made rules. 7 2 Roe has argued, to the contrary, that corporate law and securities regulation in common law countries were mostly statutory rather than judge made. 7 3 Furthermore, Roe asserted that the jury, one of the unique features of common law, which for LLSV explained the diver- 
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gence, was irrelevant in most corporate law litigation. 74 Thus, corporate law was not part of the common law core of the legal system and not an outcome of its legal origins. Another strand of criticism, suggested by Howell E. Jackson and Roe, as well as by John Coffee, holds that the level of enforcement of the rules, rather than the rules' content, can explain differences in economic outcomes. This enforcement is measured by budget and staffing levels, which presumably have nothing to do with legal origins. Beth Ahlering and Simon Deakin argue that LLSV's analysis of the effects of corporate law in isolation is misconceived. 7 6 They argue that in continental Europe, more liberal and contractual labor law developed earlier than in common law countries. This law was complementary to corporate law, and the combined effect of the law that governed capital and the law that governed labor was more similar than the apparent effect of corporate law when examined in isolation.
Similarly, Nuno Garoupa and his coauthor argue that LLSV's methodology "cherry-picked" a few corporate law doctrines for the econometric analysis without any good theoretical justification. Garoupa argues that contract law and property law are more fundamental to any legal system; the hypothesis that rules in these fields of law impact economic growth is equally conceivable. Katharina Pistor and her coauthors call attention to the legal transplant effect.
78 They find that the mode of transplantation better explains economic outcome than the legal origins of the current legal system. Internally developed law provides better economic outcomes than law received from other countries. A law that was voluntarily received by an independent state provides better outcomes than a law that was imposed by a colonial power. A law that was carried by immigrants that were already familiar with it provides a better outcome. Pistor argues that the transplantation process has better explanatory power because it reflects the level on which the legal rules are understood, internalized, and implemented.
As mentioned above, LLS, in their 2008 article The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, referenced the comparative law literature only as the basis upon which they built their own law and finance analysis. Significantly, they did not identify any criticism worth mentioning by comparative law scholars on that analysis. Indeed, for a decade, comparative law scholars totally ignored and rejected the law and finance literature. 7 9 Ironically, comparative law scholars ignored LLSV, even though LLSV had repeatedly and visibly called attention to comparative law, a subdiscipline in search of a methodology and an audience. 0 Recently, this disregard ended.
In 2009, the American Journal of Comparative Law, the most prominent comparative law journal in the United States, broke the silence with a theme issue featuring six articles on the intersections of comparative law and legal origins. In the article that opened the theme issue, Ralf Michaels noted that the silence has three negative consequences. 8 ' First, economists will continue to ignore comparative lawyers in the sense that from the comparative literature, they will selectively pick some basic stylized facts but will not engage in dialogue. Second, comparative lawyers will miss the opportunity to assess the progress of their field and the promises and shortcomings of an interdisciplinary focus. Third, silence means that comparative law as a field remains (or increasingly becomes) irrelevant for political projects because others better positioned to influence policymaking on the national and transnational levels discuss more and more of its themes.
The University of Toronto Law Journal also devoted an issue to a similar theme in 2009. Its title was "Focus: Economics and Comparative Law." The editor was Catherine Valcke, and four contributions followed her introduction. tial relevance of the legal origins literature to legal scholars and for the late response to the challenge by comparative lawyers.
CONCLUSION
Economists might conclude, based on the three examples discussed in this Essay, that economists took the lead in the positive study of legal institutions, their development, and function and that other disciplines, the legal discipline included, only utilize and apply the innovations offered by economists. Legal scholars, on the other hand, might conclude that these three examples demonstrate that economists make contributions that are irrelevant to legal scholarship. They might find that the economists' contributions are based on unrealistic assumptions, simplistic data gathering, or historical research, and thus, are too superficial. They might find them too historical or too positive. They might find the theoretical basis and the policy implications as too promarket. They might find that the economists' contributions are inclined towards favoring Anglo-American solutions and the common law model, or they might simply find them too mathematical, formal, and incomprehensible.
These three examples might be unrepresentative. Indeed, the Coase Theorem provides a striking counterexample, but it is over fifty years old.
83 I could not think of a later example of such a massive resort of economists to legal issues or of legal scholars to economics. I am not in search of examples of contributions in economics, such as game theory or behavioral economics, that are not particularly related to law and that made their way into economic analysis of the law as an addition to its set of analytical tools. I believe that the three examples in this Essay represent a wider trend. I tend to view the examples as a demonstration of the development of sites of interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary discourse.
The intensity and value of the discourse varies among the examples. The first two examples-Greif's Reputation and Coalitions and North and Weingast's Constitution and Commitment-demonstrate the development of sites within the social sciences in which sociologists, political scientists, and historians converse with economists. Legal scholars, though making courteous reference to these canonical articles, have so far missed most of the potential for engaging with these contributions and with the social scientists who debate and apply them. The third example-LLSV's Legal Origins-is particularly intriguing. Legal scholars are well represented in this debate in two ways. One way is through contributions that are not uniquely legal but are highly relevant and well received. This means that they take 83 See Coase, supra note 2. part in the discourse on equal terms, even econometrically, with economists and finance and management scholars. Another way is through contributions with a uniquely legal voice. These contributions bring into the debate the details of the rules, the enforcement procedures, the interaction with other fields of law, the effects of legal institutions, the knowledge of legal history, and the dynamics of legal change. They do not bring a coherent body of legal theory but instead bring perspectives, knowledge, and sensitivities.
For the contribution of the legal discipline to these emerging interdisciplinary sites of debates to be both viable and meaningful, more legal scholars have to be aware of them, be willing to take an active part in them, and bring to these sites a willingness to engage with other disciplines on their own terms, addressing the concerns and interests of those disciplines. Legal scholars should resist the temptation for expecting quid pro quo. They should not condition their willingness to engage with the contributions of economists on the willingness of economists to resort to legal scholarship. Rather than viewing economists as imperialistic, they should celebrate the fact that economists and finance scholars finally realized that the law matters and recognized its significance by awarding the Nobel Prize to institutional economists that take the law seriously. At the same time, to maintain their relevance and their ability to contribute, legal scholars have to bring to these new interdisciplinary debates a unique legal voice, not necessarily a legal theory, but definitely legal perspectives, sensitivities, and knowledge. A major challenge for positive legal scholars in the near future will be to find ways of reconciling these seemingly contradictory challenges. nomic history. This category also includes history resources that focus on a particular group, country or geographic area.
Category Name Law
Category Description: Law covers resources from both general and specialized areas of national and international law, including comparative law, criminology, business law, banking, corporate and tax law, constitutional law, civil rights, copyright and intellectual property law, environmental law, family law, medicine and the law as well as psychology and the law.
Category Name-Political Science Category Description: Political Science covers resources concerned with political studies, military studies, the electoral and legislative processes, political theory, history of political science, comparative studies of political systems, and the interaction of politics and other areas of science and social science.
Category Name. Social Sciences, Interdisciplinary Category Description: Social Sciences, Interdisciplinary includes resources with an interdisciplinary approach to the field such as studies on social sciences and computers, time and society, evaluation practice, black studies, information science and society, homosexuality studies, childhood studies, and death studies.
Category Name: Sociology Category Description: Sociology covers resources that focus on the study of human society, social structures, and social change as well as human behavior as it is shaped by social forces. Areas covered in this category include community studies, socio-ethnic problems, rural sociology, sociobiology, social deviance, gender studies, the sociology of law, the sociology of religion, and comparative sociology.
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